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FROM: PARIS

TO: Secretary of State

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PRIORITY

RAPACKI PLAN.

FOLLOWING SUPPLEMENTS SEPARATE TELEGRAM ON QUESTION OF DEALING WITH COUNTER PROPOSALS TO RAPACKI PLAN AND REFLECTS OUR PRELIMINARY THINKING AND SUGGESTIONS.

AS INDICATED POLTOS 2008 AND 2009, WE HAVE TENDED TO BELIEVE TIME HAS COME FOR UNITED STATES TO CLEARLY SET FORTH ITS POSITION ON RAPACKI PLAN ITSELF. IN ABSENCE OF CLEAR UNITED STATES POSITION, NATO CONSIDERATION OF THESE SUBJECTS CAN RESULT IN FURTHER WEAKENING BY SCANDINAVIANS, UNITED KINGDOM AND CANADA AND POSSIBLE DETERIORATION OF POSITION OF OTHERS. ASSUME FACT THAT ADENAUER HAS TAKEN STRONG POSITION AGAINST RAPACKI PLAN SHOULD, WE BELIEVE, DO AWAY WITH INHIBITIONS WE MAY HAVE FELT TOWARD TAKING A POSITION ON WHICH CONTINENTAL ALLIES SHOULD HAVE PRIMARY INITIATION.

FOREGOING CONCLUSION HEIGHTENED BY INTERESTING EXCHANGE WITH DE STAERCKE, WHO PUT OUT INFORMAL TENTATIVE FEELER TO USRO OFFICER SUGGESTING WEST MIGHT ACCEPT BAN ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN GERMANY, POLAND AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA IF USSR AGREED REDUCE ITS CONVENTIONAL FORCES IN SOVIET ZONE TO LEVEL CORRESPONDING ROUGHLY TO NATO FORCES IN FEDERAL REPUBLIC. SAID PROPOSAL WOULD MEET USSR POINT OF NOT (RPT NOT) INCREASING NATO ATOMIC CAPABILITY AND WOULD "ONLY" REDUCE TACTICAL NUCLEAR CAPABILITY OF UNITED STATES FORCES. WE POINTED OUT THAT QUESTION OF NUMBERS OF TROOPS AS DISTINGUISHED FROM NUMBERS OF DIVISIONS MIGHT MEAN SOVIETS WOULD NOT (RPT NOT) REALLY REDUCE THEIR FORCES. ON PERSONAL BASIS, SAID

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BASIS, SAID WE THOUGHT SERIOUS QUESTION WOULD ARISE AS TO ABILITY TO MAINTAIN NATO FORCES IN GERMANY UNDER THIS ARRANGEMENT WITHOUT NUCLEAR WEAPONS. BEFORE WE COULD MAKE OTHER COMMENTS, DE STAERCKE JUMPED ON FOREGOING POINT. SAID THAT WHAT HAD INSPIRED HIM HAD BEEN CONVERSATION BETWEEN GAITSKELL (UNITED KINGDOM) AND BOYESEN (NORWAY) LAST WEEK IN WHICH GAITSKELL SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT RAPACKI PLAN UNLESS IT WERE MADE CLEAR TO HIM THAT UNITED STATES WOULD WITHDRAW ITS FORCES AS RESULT THEREOF. DE STAERCKE IN STRONGEST TERMS URGED UNITED STATES TAKE INITIATIVE IN JANUARY 22 NAC MEETING AND POINT OUT EFFECT OF ACCEPTANCE THEREOF. IN SUCH EVENT HE WOULD SUPPORT UNITED STATES STRONGLY AND HE FELT SURE WE COULD KILL RAPACKI PLAN IN NATO. (COMMENT: IMPLICATION WAS HE WOULD ALSO GET WORD TO GAITSKELL). HE SAID BELGIAN GOVERNMENT WAS SOUND ON THIS POINT BUT EVEN BELGIAN PUBLIC OPINION NEEDED NATO LEADERSHIP WHICH UNITED STATES COULD STIMULATE.

THEREFORE BELIEVE UNITED STATES SHOULD SPEAK ALONG FOLLOWING LINES ON JANUARY 22:

1. PROBLEM OF WESTERN AND FREE WORLD OPINION IS FACING US WITH INCREASING DIFFICULTY. TEND TO AGREE WITH SPAAK THAT THIS IS BASICALLY FAULT OF GOVERNMENTS IN FAILING TO LEAD THAT OPINION.
2. TASK IS NOT (RPT NOT) EASY. PEOPLES, LIKE GOVERNMENTS, ARE WORRIED AND DISSATISFIED AT PRESENT SITUATION. THEY LOOK FOR SOMETHING BETTER, SOME PANACEA. BUT IT IS NOT (RPT NOT) EASY TO EXPLAIN TO PUBLICS REASONS WHY MORE DRAMATIC SOLUTIONS CANNOT (RPT NOT) AFFORD REAL SECURITY. PUBLICS ARE REALLY FIGHTING THE PROBLEM OF NEED TO MAINTAIN STATUS QUO OF DETERRENT FORCES IN BEING UNTIL REALLY SECURE FORMULA IS ACCEPTED BY SOVIETS. THEY DO NOT (RPT NOT) REALIZE THAT SOVIET, RATHER THAN WESTERN INTRANSIGENCE, IS ROOT CAUSE OF PRESENT SITUATION.
3. BUT AS SPAAK HAS SAID, WE MUST LEAD OUR PUBLIC OPINION IN RIGHT DIRECTION. THIS PUTS UNITED STATES IN SPECIAL POSITION REGARDING

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POSITION REGARDING PROPOSALS FOR EUROPEAN SECURITY. OBVIOUSLY IMPORTANT THAT INITIATIVE ON THESE MEASURES SHOULD COME FROM EUROPEANS. THERE MUST BE NO BASIS FOR SAYING THAT UNITED STATES HAS FORCED ATOMIC WEAPONS OR VISITING FORCES UPON ITS NATO ALLIES.

4. AT SAME TIME THERE SHOULD BE NO MISTAKE AS TO UNITED STATES POSITION. WHILE UNITED STATES WILL LEAVE NO STONE UNTURNED TO FIND A SAFE AND SOUND MILITARY AND POLITICAL BASIS FOR AGREEMENT WITH THE SOVIETS THAT WILL CONTRIBUTE TO SECURITY OF WHOLE WORLD, IT CERTAINLY DOES NOT (RPT NOT) PROPOSE TO SACRIFICE REAL SECURITY FOR AGREEMENTS THAT ONLY PROVIDE ILLUSION OF SECURITY.

5. ALTHOUGH THE MATTER HAS LONG BEEN UNDER CONTINUING REVIEW IN WASHINGTON, WE HAVE FOUND NO IDEA TO PUT FORWARD AT THIS TIME. WE THINK THE RAPACKI PLAN IS EXTREMELY DANGEROUS FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:

A. WE MUST NEVER OVERLOOK THAT NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES HAVE CONSTANTLY AND EMPHATICALLY STATED IT IS MILITARILY UNACCEPTABLE AS EXPOSING ALLIANCE TO UNACCEPTABLE RISKS.

B. IT PUSHES ASIDE GERMAN REUNIFICATION AND WOULD BE IN CONFLICT WITH THE "BASIC LINK BETWEEN POLITICAL SOLUTIONS AND SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS" REFERRED TO IN OUR JANUARY 12 REPLY TO BULGANIN.

C. ALTHOUGH THE RUSSIANS HAVE ADMITTED THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO HAVE A COMPLETE INSPECTION SYSTEM WITH REGARD TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THEY NOW (RPT NOW) ACT AS IF SAFEGUARDS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN THE ZONE THEY PROPOSE.

D. WE DOUBT THAT, WITHOUT ANY POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THERE IS GREATER SAFETY IN THE CONFRONTATION OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES ACROSS THE BORDER, WHERE A SMALL INCIDENT COULD LEAD TO DEMAND FOR THE USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS OR IN THE GREATER DETERRENT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN THE HANDS OF CONFRONTING

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FORCES, PARTICULARLY IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CONTROL OF LONG-RANGE DELIVERY SYSTEMS IN THE REAR. ATOMIC POWER VACCUM INVITES SOVIETS TO TAKE RISK WEST MIGHT NOT (RPT NOT) USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EVENT OF CONVENTIONAL ATTACK.

E. IT IS EXTREMELY DOUBTFUL UNITED STATES PUBLIC OPINION WOULD PERMIT CONTINUED DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES TROOPS IN EUROPE (1) AGAINST ADVICE OF NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES; AND (2) WITHOUT ASSURANCE OF SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE IN POLITICAL STABILITY, OPPOSITE OF WHICH WOULD RESULT.

F. IN ADDITION, WE DOUBT GERMAN BUILDUP WOULD MATERIALIZE IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES, AND, IN LIGHT ALL THESE FACTORS, THAT NATO DEFENSE EFFORT WOULD DO OTHER THAN COLLAPSE. THE POLITICAL EFFECTS WOULD BE THE COLLAPSE OF POLITICAL UNITY OF WEST AND OPENING OF DOOR TO PIECEMEAL SOVIET SUCCESS.

WHILE WE KNOW NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES' VIEWS ON RAPACKI PLAN WILL BE NEGATIVE, BELIEVE WE SHOULD SEEK TO EXPLORE IN COUNCIL WHETHER GOVERNMENTS WOULD FEEL IT HELPFUL TO HAVE NATO MILITARY AUTHORITIES SET FORTH AS CLEARLY AS POSSIBLE, FOR USE ON UNCLASSIFIED BASIS WITH PUBLICS, REASONS WHY THEY FIND RAPACKI PLAN UNACCEPTABLE.

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